Climate and southern Africa's water–energy–food nexus by Conway, Declan et al.
  
Declan Conway, Emma Archer van Garderen, Delphine 
Deryng, Steve Dorling, Tobias Krueger, Willem Landman, 
Bruce Lankford, Karen Lebek, Tim Osborn, Claudia Ringler, 
James Thurlow, Tingju Zhu & Carole Dalin  
Climate and southern Africa's water–energy–
food nexus 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: Conway, Declan, Archer van Garderen, Emma , Deryng, Delphine, Dorling, Steve, Krueger, Tobias, 
Landman, Willem, Lankford, Bruce, Lebek, Karen, Osborn, Tim, Ringler, Claudia, Thurlow, James, Zhu, Tingju and Dalin, 
Carole (2015) Climate and southern Africa's water–energy–food nexus. Nature Climate Change, 5 (9). pp. 837-846. ISSN 
1758-678X  
DOI: 10.1038/nclimate2735   
 
© 2015 Nature Publishing Group 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63308/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or 
other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research 
Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further 
distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely 
distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you 
wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 1 
Climate and southern Africa's water-energy-food nexus 
 
In southern Africa, the connections between climate and the water-energy-food nexus are strong. Physical and 
socioeconomic exposure to climate is high in vulnerable areas and in sectors with crucial economic importance. 
Spatial co-dependence is high; climate anomalies can be regional in extent and trans-boundary river basins and 
aquifers transect the region. There is strong evidence of the effects of individual climate anomalies, yet proven 
associations between rainfall and Gross Domestic Product and crop production are relatively weak. Most nexus 
studies for southern Africa have been motivated by climate change. Whilst uncertainties remain high, for the 
southernmost countries the majority of climate models project decreases in annual precipitation, typically by as 
much as 20% by the 2080s. These changes would propagate into reduced water availability and crop yields. 
Recognition of spatial and sectoral interdependencies in the nexus should inform policies, institutions and 
investments for enhancing water, energy and food security and thus support regional prosperity in this climate-
sensitive environment. Three key political and economic instruments that mediate nexus interactions in the 
region could be strengthened for this purpose; the Southern African Development Community, the Southern 
African Power Pool, and trade of agricultural products amounting to significant transfers of embedded water.  
 
 
Introduction 
Numerous challenges coalesce to make southern Africa emblematic of the connections between 
climate and the water-energy-food nexus which has important economic influence throughout the 
region. Physical and socioeconomic exposure to climate is high in vulnerable areas and sectors, such 
as agriculture, but also in energy generation and mining. For example, almost 100% of electricity 
production in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, and Zambia is from 
hydropower. Hydropower further comprises a major component of regional energy security through 
extensive sharing as part of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). The region’s population is 
concentrated in areas exposed to high levels of hydro-meteorological variability
1
 and Africa’s population 
as a whole is projected to double by 2050
2
. Of the thirteen mainland countries and Madagascar (Table 
1) that comprise the Southern African Development Community (SADC), six are defined as low income, 
three as lower-middle income and four as upper-middle income, according to the World Bank 
Classification (using 2012 GNI per capita). There are few quantified examples of the linkages between 
climate and economic activity in the region, though economic modelling studies in Malawi and Zambia 
indicate that the severe 1992 drought caused an approximately 7-9% drop in GDP and adversely 
affected household poverty
3
. Importantly, southern Africa's economy is closely linked with that of the 
rest of the African continent through trade of agricultural and other (frequently primary industry) 
commodities, acting as an important potential buffer for climate-induced resource scarcity. 
Climate variability has important consequences for resource management in the region including for 
non-equilibrium production systems such as rangeland ecology
4
, irrigation
5
 and lakes
6
. Hence, southern 
Africa is a region where seasonal climate forecasts have potential benefit in areas where sustained 
forecast skill is demonstrated. Seasonal climate forecasting has been the subject of many studies in 
sub-Saharan Africa
7,8,9
; and the Southern African Regional Outlook Forum (SARCOF) provides advance 
information about the likely character of seasonal climate. Yet uptake has been very limited, despite 
over a decade of research on hydrological applications of seasonal forecasts
10
 there is limited evidence 
for their operational use in the water sector
9
. With ongoing climate change, annual precipitation levels, 
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soil moisture and runoff are likely to decrease, while rising temperatures could increase evaporative 
demand in large parts of the region
11
 (Figure 1).  
The last decade has seen rapid growth in research and policy interest in natural resource scarcity, with 
water-energy-food interdependencies increasingly framed as a nexus, or resource trilemma. The Bonn 
Nexus conference in 2011
10
 is notable in this process of recognising the complex interactions between 
sectors and resource systems and the need to minimise the trade-offs and risks of adverse cross-
sectoral impacts
10,12
. The nexus is increasingly prominent on policy-makers’ agendas, partly in relation 
to the post-2015 development agenda for the Sustainable Development Goals
13
. The private sector was 
another early promoter of the nexus concept
14
 due to growing associated risks affecting production 
security along supply chains, such as (but not exclusively) for water
15
. In southern Africa, for example, 
South African Brewers SABMiller are seeking better approaches to handling trade-offs between water, 
energy and food by attempting to make business decisions through a resource nexus lens
16
. Strong co-
dependencies at a range of scales give rise to a large number of trade-offs and co-benefits, according 
to the heterogeneous configurations of societal uses of water across river basins and aquifers. For 
example, irrigation and other consumptive water uses may bring opportunity costs for downstream 
energy generation and environmental sustainability such as in the Rufiji and Zambezi basins. 
Development of new hydropower facilities can increase evaporation and alter river flow regimes, 
particularly during low flow seasons. The region’s many transboundary basins require that trade-offs 
among upstream and downstream water uses are reconciled between countries. 
Previous nexus studies have concentrated on global interdependencies
17
, problem framing
18
 or case 
studies of trade-offs and co-benefits in specific systems such as islands
19
 and irrigation and hydropower 
production
20
. Here, we examine southern Africa’s nexus through a climate lens and modify Hoff’s nexus 
framework
10
 which integrates global trends (drivers) with fields of action, to highlight the role of climate 
as a driver in southern Africa’s nexus (Figure 2). Climate encompasses average (i.e. 30-year) 
conditions, variability over years to decades (i.e. as observed) and anthropogenic climate change. In 
terms of the nexus, we consider the main elements of intra-regional linkages in water-energy-food at a 
national level, while highlighting connections at the river basin scale and drawing attention to some of 
the many examples of specific trade-offs and synergies. We base our review on published studies, 
complemented by empirical analysis of available national-level data on climate, water resources, crop 
production, trade and GDP. We first consider national-level exposure of water, energy and food 
production to climate variability in aggregate economic terms and analyse the relationship between 
inter-annual and multi-year climate variability and economic activity, focusing on GDP and agricultural 
production. We then outline the potential for connecting areas with robust seasonal climate forecasting 
skill in areas with socially and economically important nexus related activities, and summarise studies 
that model the impact of anthropogenic climate change on elements of the nexus. Finally, we describe 
three key intra-regional mechanisms for balancing nexus components and conclude by identifying 
knowledge gaps in southern Africa’s climate and water-energy-food nexus. 
 
National level exposure of nexus sectors to climate 
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We characterise exposure as the interaction between characteristics of the climate system (particularly 
inter-annual rainfall variability) and a country’s dependence on climate-sensitive economic activities 
such as the share of agriculture in GDP, the proportion of rain-fed agricultural land and the energy 
contribution from hydroelectric sources (Table 1, Figure 3). South Africa’s GDP is larger than that of the 
other 12 economies combined. The direct contribution of agriculture to the economy is lowest (<10%) in 
South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia, Angola and Lesotho, 13% in Zimbabwe, and over 20% in 
the other countries. If agricultural processing were included in agricultural GDP, the shares would be 
substantially larger in most, if not all, SADC countries. The share of cropland equipped for irrigation is 
low in most of the region, with the exception of Madagascar, South Africa and Swaziland (Table 1). The 
contribution of hydropower in energy production is very high overall (Figure 3), but varies considerably 
across the region, from 1.5% of energy production in South Africa, over 30% in Madagascar, Swaziland 
and Zimbabwe, to almost 100% in DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, and Zambia. Reliable electricity production is 
at risk during prolonged droughts, and also during extreme flooding events, when dam safety is an 
additional risk. Over 90% of South Africa's energy generation is coal-based
21
, well above the rest of the 
region. Coal-fired power plants with wet cooling systems consume far more water than most other 
energy technologies
22
. South Africa’s main energy utility Eskom uses about 2% of the country’s 
freshwater resources, mainly for coal-fired power stations
23
. Coal mining and energy generation from 
coal both substantially impact water quality and availability
24
. To reduce these impacts, Eskom has 
implemented a dry-cooling system in two existing power stations and all new power stations will use 
dry-cooling
23
, enabling a 15-fold reduction in water use of power stations.  
Overall, there are strong contrasts (Table 1) in energy (8-84% of energy consumption imported) and 
food (5-90% of cereal food imported) self-sufficiency, and in the sustainability of freshwater use, 
expressed as freshwater withdrawals relative to total actual renewable water resources (TARWR) (0.1-
24%). Countries facing most water shortage, expressed as share of TARWR withdrawn (Table 1), are 
South Africa (24%), Swaziland (23%), and Zimbabwe (21%), well within categories defined as 
physically water-scarce (ratio larger than 20%
25
). We interpret this indicator with caution, noting its 
failure to capture the complex spatial and temporal distribution of water, political-economic access, 
differences in water needs and socioeconomic capacity to support effective water utilisation
26,27
. Sub-
national areas of high demand relative to availability include southern Malawi, Namibia and Botswana. 
Low ratios of water withdrawal to TARWR (such as 0.05% in DRC
27
) could also indicate economic water 
scarcity due to inadequate investments to harness and deliver water. 
The cereal import dependency ratio (Table 1) reflects the importance of imports in the volume of grains 
available for consumption in the country (i.e. Production + Imports - Exports). It is particularly high for 
the small countries of Swaziland and Lesotho, and more strikingly so for larger nations like Botswana 
(90%), Namibia (65%) and Angola (55%). Dependency ratios are lowest in Zambia and Malawi. Total 
food aid received by the region (260,000 tons in 2012, Figure S1) was equivalent to about 2-3% of food 
imported by the region from the rest of the world (9 million tons in 2008). Chronic and episodic food 
insecurity remain important problems in the region. The causes of inadequate food access are multiple 
and, at the household and individual level, they are dominated by poverty, environmental stressors and 
conflict, often underpinned by chronic structural elements in the lives of communities, intensified by 
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sudden shocks which can be climate related such as decrease in cereal availability and food price 
increases
28,29
.    
 
Climate signals in the nexus 
Multi-year rainfall variability in southern Africa is higher than in many other parts of the world
30
. Inter-
annual variability, expressed as the coefficient of variation (CoV), is not particularly high at national 
scales: < 20% for most countries, except for the driest two countries Botswana and Namibia (Figure 3). 
However, rainfall displays much greater local variability (local CoV exceeds 20% across much of the 
SADC region), strong seasonality, and a range of longer periodicities from multi-annual to decadal
31
. At 
the national level, long-term trends in rainfall between 1901 and 2012 are modest (the linear trend is 
insignificant relative to the long-term average) without evidence of any clear spatial pattern (Table S1). 
Linear trends during the last two decades show varied behaviour; three countries with wetting trends 
above 20% of the long-term mean annual rainfall (Botswana, Namibia and Zambia) and Tanzania with a 
drying trend of 21% (Table S1). National level analysis is likely to obscure local trends and trend results 
are highly sensitive to the period chosen for analysis, particularly in regions with strong multi-annual 
variability. 
We use correlation analysis to explore the associations between annual rainfall and national economic 
activity (GDP annual growth rate) and agricultural production (all cereals and maize - the most 
significant crop in the region). Fifteen year sliding correlations are used to examine the temporal stability 
of associations between variables (see SI Methods and data). There are no statistically significant 
relationships between annual rainfall and GDP growth rate and none of the mean 15-year sliding 
correlations are significant (Table 2). Correlation of rainfall with total production of cereals and maize 
shows three countries with significant relationships at 1% level and three at 5% level (although for DRC, 
it is negative and possibly spurious). The average sliding correlations are somewhat higher (but not 
statistically significant, Table S2).  
Time series data of hydropower production are not publically available and not easily comparable 
between sites/countries, making it difficult to assess the importance of climate variability as a driver of 
energy production fluctuations. Electricity insecurity is known to negatively affect total factor productivity 
and labour productivity of small and medium-sized enterprises but the relationship is as yet not 
straightforward, with differences between countries and measurement effects
32
. Studies of specific 
events highlight what are major consequences of some drought-induced reductions in electricity 
production
33
. Ref. 18 cites examples of drought impact on the Kariba Dam (Zambezi River basin), 
during 1991-92, resulting in an estimated $102 million reduction in GDP and $36 million reduction in 
export earnings; and Kenya where, during 2000, a 25% reduction in hydropower capacity resulted in an 
estimated 1.5% reduction in GDP. A review of the economics of climate change in Tanzania profiled the 
consequences of drought in 2003, which brought the Mtera dam reservoir levels close to the minimum 
required for electricity generation
34
. This prompted Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) to 
approach a private provider to use gas turbine units at huge cost. A more recent World Bank estimate 
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put costs of power shortages in Tanzania at $1.7 million per day with an average 63 days a year with 
power outages
34
. 
 
Early warnings from the climate system  
Given the linkages between climate and the water-energy-food nexus in the region, seasonal forecast 
information can play an important role in guiding nexus-related decision-making, depending on forecast 
skill and utility. Seasonal to inter-annual variability in southern Africa is high, but so is its predictability 
relative to other regions, depending on location and time of the year
35
 and phase of the El Niño-
Southern Oscillation
36
 (ENSO). This can be seen by considering the association (Figure 4a) between 
Nino3.4 sea surface temperatures (SST) - as a representation of ENSO - and gridded rainfall over 
southern Africa south of 15°S
37
. A state-of-the-art coupled ocean-atmosphere model has some skill in 
predicting seasonal (December to February, DJF) rainfall over the region at a 1-month lead-time (DJF 
forecasts produced in November, Figure 4b shows areas with statistically significant correlation
36
, see 
SI Methods and data) Stronger ENSO associations and best model performance are found for 
maximum temperatures (Figure S2). The areas where ENSO impacts significantly and where forecast 
skill levels are relatively high include the river basins of the Limpopo, Orange, Umgeni and lower 
Zambezi.  
The Limpopo river basin is particularly notable as having both high economic productivity and strong 
ENSO associations and forecast skill. Comprising 408,800km
2
, and including the countries of South 
Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the Limpopo basin is one of the most water stressed in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and features some of the largest urban conglomerations (including Pretoria, 
Johannesburg, Gaborone, Francistown and Bulawayo). Irrigation comprises more than 50% of basin 
water use and other infrastructure (including industry and mining) also highly dependent on basin water. 
There are significant mining activities in the basin, particularly in South Africa and Zimbabwe
38
, that 
generate major water pollution downstream
39
. The Limpopo is heavily regulated, with extensive plans 
for further development stimulating increased focus on better monitoring and research for development 
of the basin. 
Finally, although forecast skill is critical, and has potential utility in economic productivity hotspots such 
as the Limpopo Basin, a range of barriers persist in the region to realizing the benefits of seasonal 
forecasting. A comprehensive review of seasonal forecasting status in sub-Saharan Africa identified 
persistent constraints in the use of forecast products, which were generally insufficient to inform 
response actions, such as production decisions and institutional actions
40
. If these barriers can be 
overcome, seasonal forecasting has the potential to contribute to smoothing fluctuations in the nexus by 
informing guidance on the early targeting of or access to agricultural inputs and credit, design of 
interventions during food crises, and improvements to trade and agricultural insurance
40-42
.   
 
Modelling the nexus in a changing climate  
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The challenges for the water-energy-food nexus posed by inter-annual variability occur in the context of 
a gradually changing climate. Even if an international agreement to limit global warming to 2°C above 
pre-industrial conditions is successfully developed, climate models project significant changes that 
exceed the range of natural climate variability (Figure 1). Most southern African countries warm more 
than the global-mean in most climate models, with annual-mean temperatures rising by 2 to 3°C in most 
cases. Precipitation changes are more uncertain, with both increases and decreases possible. 
Nevertheless, for most countries the majority of models project decreases in annual precipitation, 
typically by as much as 20% though more for some models and countries. Except for the southernmost 
countries, there is a tendency for models that warm most to simulate stronger reductions in 
precipitation, a combination that could have severe impacts across the water-energy-food nexus. 
Analysis of extreme precipitation in climate models used for IPCC AR4 shows a marked delay in rainy 
season onset over most of the region and an early end to the season in parts of the region
43
. 
Most nexus studies for southern Africa have been motivated by climate change and assess biophysical 
impacts for specific sectors, e.g., rainfall and irrigation water availability on crop production, or river flow 
changes on hydropower generation. Some crop models simulate sizable yield losses for southern 
Africa
44
, suggesting the region’s food system could be particularly vulnerable to climate change
45
. 
Differences in climate scenarios, impact models, spatial and temporal scales and processes 
represented, restrict our ability to reliably define impacts for specific sectors and, importantly, secondary 
effects across the water-energy-food nexus. Nevertheless, an estimate of the range of potential impacts 
on maize yield (and the wide range in uncertainty) can be determined from the 30-member ensemble of 
global gridded crop models run by the ISI-MIP programme
46
 (see SI). The simulated maize yield 
averaged across southern Africa decreases by 15.7±16.3% (rain-fed) and 8.3±20.4% (irrigated) by the 
2080s relative to the 2000s, i.e. a yield reduction for the median but with a substantial range of different 
outcomes. The wide range is due to climate uncertainties described earlier and large uncertainties in 
our understanding of crop response to climate change, particularly the role of elevated atmospheric CO2 
concentration on photosynthesis and crop water use efficiency. Median impacts in the top five southern 
African producers are relatively small in the 2020s and 2050s, becoming more substantially negative by 
the 2080s, with a stronger level of agreement in the sign of change among simulations (Figure 5) but an 
increasing inter-model range. Among these countries, rain-fed cultivation is more negatively impacted, 
highlighting that water stress is an important limiting factor to crop yield in the region. Along with 
declining maize yields, average crop water use decreases at a slightly faster rate in both rain-fed and 
irrigated maize growing areas, resulting in a 5.9±20.7% increase in estimated crop water productivity in 
rain-fed maize growing areas and a 9.2±17.9% increase in irrigated systems (see SI and Figure S3) by 
the end of the 21st century.  
An ensemble of global hydrological models driven by five climate scenarios from the CMIP5 programme 
shows reductions in annual discharge from 0 to 50% for the multi-model mean across much of southern 
Africa, excluding Southwest Botswana
47
. River basin and water management models indicate higher 
risks for Zambezi hydropower generation
48; 49
; while regional and global water and food models suggest 
lower runoff raises risks for water and food security in southern Africa in general
50-52
.  
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The economic dimensions of the nexus in southern Africa can be studied using general equilibrium 
models that translate biophysical impacts into economic outcomes. This approach simulates economies 
as adapting to shocks, albeit imperfectly, through market and resource adjustments. Incorporating 
economic adaptation generally leads to smaller impacts than those from biophysical studies. Global 
models rarely separate southern Africa from sub-Saharan Africa, leaving country-level studies as the 
region’s main evidence base. Historical climate variability imposes high costs on low-income agrarian 
economies
53; 54
 and climate change is likely to have adverse effects on food security
55-58
. However, long-
term change in annual precipitation and temperature may impact less than historical variability until 
2050
53, 3
. Historical data show substantial variability in smallholder farm yields and incomes. Increase in 
future variability of smallholder farm yields from climate change and its propagation into increased 
variability in farm incomes is likely to increase food insecurity risks for farmers who are already at high 
risk
59
. Although most studies focus on agriculture
60; 61
, this is not always the main impact channel. For 
example, nexus studies find that road damages from flooding and weather stress are equally or more 
important drivers of the economic losses associated with climate change in Mozambique and South 
Africa
60
. More integrated multi-sector/country-level studies are needed to guide adaptation responses. 
A second strand of economic research focuses on climate and energy policy. A high proportion of 
SADC greenhouse gas emissions are from South Africa due especially to its reliance on coal-fired 
power. Curbing these emissions may reduce national income and employment, because financing 
domestic renewable options requires higher electricity tariffs
62; 63
. Lifting South Africa’s restrictions on 
hydropower imports would reduce investment costs and economic losses
64
. Climate change will have 
considerable indirect impacts on electricity generation, with positive feedback mechanisms because 
higher water and air temperatures make cooling processes in coal-fired power plants less effective and 
potential reductions in water availability during longer dry periods
23
, this could result in an overall 
reduction of power plant efficiency and higher carbon emissions. Within its climate change strategy, 
Eskom aspires to diversify its energy generation mix to lower carbon-emitting technologies
65
. Solar 
photovoltaic and wind energy are considered to be the most viable renewable options in terms of water 
withdrawal and consumption compared with biofuel and hydropower
24
. Biofuels may reduce the region’s 
imported fossil fuels and reduce rural poverty, but have potential food security trade-offs
66
. Research 
indicates that continued climate change, economic development and urbanization will strengthen inter-
dependencies in the water, energy and food nexus in southern Africa and that climate and associated 
energy policy will further reinforce the costs of trade-offs and complementarities across the WEF nexus, 
especially so if expansionist regional hydropower and biofuel strategies are adopted. 
 
Intra-regional instruments for the water, energy and food nexus 
Southern Africa can be characterised as a single economic block of strongly interlinked economies 
where water, energy and food flow between producers and consumers, while also displaying 
considerable heterogeneity in its natural resource endowments and infrastructure distribution, its socio-
political cohesion and its economic development. For both the region and individual nations, this implies 
significant challenges in attempting to balance supply and demand while maintaining coherent policies 
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towards integrated management of water-energy-food resources. The region is well placed to transfer 
resources intra-regionally to meet energy and food shortfalls. However, rising demand for electricity, 
food and water throughout southern Africa may sharpen the region’s sensitivity to climate-induced 
shocks. Fifteen trans-boundary river basins transect the region, including the large Congo and Zambezi 
basins, shared by nine and eight countries, respectively, as well as many smaller shared catchments. 
Surface catchments are underlain by an estimated 16 trans-boundary aquifers
67
. 
The origin of the southern African economic block can be tied to the dominant position of South Africa 
and its history alongside other ex-South African and British colonies such as Swaziland, Zimbabwe, 
Botswana, Namibia and Zambia. South Africa in particular has great cultural, economic and political 
influence over its neighbours making its role as a source (and sometimes a sink) of energy, water, and 
food hegemonic
68
. This alliance and influence is also evidenced via the SAPP (South Africa has 77% of 
SAPP’s installed power supply capacity
69
), and the SADC and other agreements.  
In responding to the distribution of and demand for water-energy-food resources, three key instruments 
have emerged. First, the SADC, based in Botswana, addresses how member countries sharing rivers 
might resolve water allocation priorities through a Protocol on Shared Watercourses
70; 71
. The presence 
of significant water demands arising from irrigated agriculture and the Gauteng urban industrial complex 
in South Africa has led to relatively sophisticated water sharing agreements such as the Joint 
Development and Utilization of the Water Resources of Komati River Basin
72
 and Lesotho Highlands 
Development Project respectively. Large-scale dams and inter-basin, often trans-boundary, transfers 
form part of national water-energy-food security strategies (ref. 73 reports 27 existing ones)
73
. South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, which have the largest numbers of dams, use these predominantly for irrigation 
and water supply, whilst Mozambique, which has one of the largest total dam capacities, concentrates 
on hydropower production (Table S3). Notwithstanding these institutional and physical structures, 
however, in some instances water sharing still suffers from a lack of institutional integration (particularly 
between agricultural and water institutions) and incomplete efforts to increase stakeholder participation 
and decentralise water management (ref. 74; reviewing South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique)
74
. 
Coordination during flood events can also be challenging, for example the persistent 2010/11 summer 
rainfall in the Zambezi River Basin catchment area resulted in high water levels of Lake Kariba. 
Opening of spillway gates raised downstream water levels increasing flooding and compromised 
effective reservoir management at Cahora Bassa further downstream in Mozambique
75
.  
Second, the SAPP is a remarkable alliance of 12 energy-generating bodies from 12 countries inter-
connected through a grid to help smooth spatial and temporal shortfalls in electrical capacity. It was 
established in 1995 by the member governments of SADC (excluding Mauritius) to develop an 
interconnected electrical system, coordinate and enforce common regional standards, harmonise 
relationships, develop expertise across member utilities, and promote sustainable development
76
. The 
SAPP electricity generating mix in 2012-13 was 54,923 MW, comprising a significant proportion from 
hydropower (17.4%), but dominated by coal (72.9%). The network is intended to function as a 
competitive market in which surpluses and deficits are resolved via trades and negotiations and 
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therefore has potential to serve as a buffering mechanism for climate-induced river basin scale 
electricity insecurity. 
Third, food trade in southern Africa naturally results from regional variability in production, especially of 
maize. Large and efficient producers in South Africa induce a trade surplus with other SADC members. 
Importantly, trade of agricultural products corresponds to significant transfers of embedded water 
resources, or “virtual water trade” (VWT, see SI Data and Methods). Water resources embedded in 
South Africa’s regional food exports (0.9 km
3
 in 2008, Figure 6a)
77
 account for half of the total intra-
regional flow (1.9 km
3
). The dominant link is from South Africa to Zimbabwe, with a volume of 0.4 km
3
/y 
of virtual water, followed by Mozambique to Malawi (0.3 km
3
/y). Zimbabwe is the region’s major virtual 
water importer, importing 0.66 km
3
/y from other southern African nations. Considering all international 
food trade, southern Africa is largely a net importer of virtual water. Indeed, international imports from 
outside the region (9 million tons of food, or 10.8 km
3
 of virtual water) dominate the VWT flows of 
southern Africa (13.5 km
3
/y, Figure 6a, b). In return, smaller volumes to outside the region are exported 
mainly from South Africa (0.4 km
3
/y), followed by Namibia (0.2 km
3
/y) and Botswana (0.2 km
3
/y). About 
7% of South African virtual water exports via food are irrigation-based (blue) water embedded in maize 
(0.066 km
3
), representing almost all of the intra-regional blue VWT (0.067 km
3
)
78
. This small percentage 
reflects the dominance of rain fed (green water) agriculture in the region. Although strong open trade is 
an important tool to alleviate climate-induced food deficits
79; 80
, and virtual water trade openness tends 
to reduce undernourishment
81
, southern African countries have varying levels of trade connectivity and 
trade link strengths, both for intra- and extra-regional food trade links. Thus, the potential benefits of 
food trade to alleviate production shocks are likely uneven across the region, and require further 
investigation. 
Informal border trade has become a regular feature of the region’s maize economy since market reform 
in the 1990s. Estimates suggest that up to 150,000–250,000 tonnes of maize flow from Mozambique to 
Malawi during years of good production in Mozambique and high demand in Malawi
82
. These important 
informal imports play a crucial role in alleviating food shortages. Informal traders are less encumbered 
by trade regulations than larger formal grain traders, and hence can respond to arbitrage opportunities 
more quickly
83
. Trade could play a greater role in the response to food crises than it has in previous 
decades, though Zambia and Malawi frequently impose maize export bans during crisis years
83
. One of 
SADC’s main goals for regional integration is to promote trade across member countries. Efforts are 
ongoing to reduce major existing barriers, such as trade regulations and lack of reliable transportation 
infrastructure
84
, notably via the Protocol on Trade
85
, including facilitation of customs processes, and 
a regional infrastructure plan for the transport sector
86
. 
 
Conclusion and outlook 
Climate plays an important role in determining medium-term water availability, potential agricultural 
production, and some components of energy production and demand. Climate variability drives 
fluctuations in WEF elements with secondary effects across the whole nexus (Figure 1). Exposure and 
sensitivity to climate variability and climate change are high across nexus sectors that include 
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substantial areas of economic activity in southern Africa and there is strong evidence of the effects of 
individual climate events. For example, South Africa, experienced a 7% drop in GDP in the 1983 El 
Niño year, and climatic fluctuations resulted in GDP variations of up to US $5 billion
87
. The 2000 floods 
in Mozambique led to devastating impacts on livelihoods, electricity supplies and basic infrastructure
88
. 
Yet our analysis of associations between rainfall, GDP and crop production using available data shows 
mostly weak correlations. This is likely to be partly a function of scale, where national and annual scales 
obscure stronger relationships that may exist at finer levels of analysis. Data availability (e.g. absence 
of publically available hydropower production time series) and quality also play a role. The country 
climate estimates are based on sparse station coverage for many countries in the region, particularly 
since the 1980s
37
 and recent scrutiny of GDP data for sub-Saharan Africa has highlighted lack of 
transparency in data sources and collection methods, lack of metadata and lack of detail on methods of 
aggregation
89
. This leads to differences between GDP estimates, non-random errors, adjustments to 
historical data, and inhomogeneity in time series. National statistical offices are woefully under-
resourced in sub-Saharan Africa. The need for good quality data is paramount and urgent, to underpin 
reliable modelling of the physical and economic dimensions of the nexus and for defining baselines and 
indicators as the global community approaches agreement on the Sustainable Development Goals
90
. 
River flows in the region are strongly linked to seasonal rainfall and temperature variations, and the 
information reviewed here provides evidence that seasonal forecasting of river flows in some basins has 
application potential. However, the benefits from seasonal forecasting for reducing net food and energy 
imports through enhanced agricultural and hydropower production/energy mix have yet to be studied 
and, even more importantly, implemented in practice. For the future, climate models show fairly strong 
agreement that the southern countries in the region may become drier and the secondary impacts 
though very uncertain, are likely to be significant across the water-energy-food nexus.  
Water, energy and food are linked across different scales in southern Africa. Spatial co-dependence is 
high and climate anomalies can be regional in extent, for example ENSO related droughts and river 
basin scale floods. At the national level, water and energy are closely coupled through significant 
hydropower production in several countries. Water for biofuels and cooling for electricity generation 
remains relatively modest except for cooling in South Africa. Water and food linkages are strong, 
through green water requirements in rain-fed agriculture and through irrigation (blue) water, which 
account for most freshwater consumption in the region. Food and energy linkages are growing due to 
increasing irrigation, mechanisation, and fertilization of agriculture, while biofuel development remains 
low. The rapidly growing demand for energy by industry and mining, rapidly growing urban areas, and 
agricultural intensification are likely to impose increasing strain on the water-food-energy nexus. At the 
regional level, nexus linkages are strong, due to multiple shared major river basins and aquifers, the 
SAPP power-sharing infrastructure, and intra-regional food and embedded water trade. These linkages 
are enhanced by governance mechanisms such as the SADC, which has established protocols on 
shared water, energy, and food security, a regional seasonal climate forecasting forum (SARCOF) and 
initiatives on trade and the green economy.  
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Debate is ongoing about whether there is anything new about the nexus that distinguishes it from earlier 
integrative framings
91,92
. Some argue that a nexus framing is better at uncovering more effective 
approaches and methods for cross-sectoral integration by examining trade-offs and co-benefits, and 
through linking disparate knowledge sets and improving governance
91
. However, entrenched vertically 
structured government departments and sector-based structures of agencies, policies and regulatory 
mechanisms complicate coordination and remain challenges to cross-sectoral integration
91-93
. The 
political economy of governance and operation is also challenged by regional and intra-regional 
institutional capacity and power imbalances. Our review suggests that climate change, combined with 
increasing demand associated with wider socio-economic development pathways, will intensify 
interdependencies in the WEF nexus, particularly shorter-term pressures associated extreme events. 
We have outlined some of the main interdependencies and key regional institutional and policy 
structures in southern Africa. There is a need to map these structures at finer scales, to understand 
where trends and shocks have been managed effectively in the past, and to identify measures that 
enhance successful cross-sectoral approaches. In a highly climate-sensitive environment such as 
southern Africa, emerging strategies - such as those under SADC - will only bear fruit if recognition of 
co-dependencies and inter-relationships in the nexus provides the basis for credible and well-monitored 
actions. 
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Main Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Average annual total precipitation (1961-1990) and multi-model ensembles of projected 
changes in national-average annual precipitation (y-axis, pre, as a fraction of 1961–1990 mean) and 
national-average annual-mean temperature (x-axis, tmp, °C change from 1961–1990 mean), estimated 
for a global warming of 2 °C using a pattern-scaling approach
94
.  The three ensembles are CMIP3 (21 
models: open colored symbols and pink shaded distribution), CMIP5 (20 models: filled colored symbols 
and brown shaded distribution) and QUMP (17 versions of the HadCM3 model with perturbed physical 
parameter values: black symbols and blue shaded distribution).  The shaded distributions are fit to the 
data to represent the bivariate ±2 standard deviation ranges and have been included to facilitate 
comparison of the model ensembles rather than to represent probabilistic projections of climate.  Black 
dots and black fitted distributions illustrate the ranges of internal variability of 30-year mean climate 
simulated in a 1000-year control simulation of HadCM3, for comparison with the projected changes in 
climate. 
 
Figure 2: Modified version of nexus framework of Hoff
10
 integrating global drivers with fields of action, to 
illustrate the main timescales of climate as a driver in southern Africa. 
 
Figure 3: National rainfall variability and socio-economic exposure to hydro-climate; a – c individual 
countries, d: Average, minimum and maximum of 13 countries. Sources: Rainfall interannual variability 
(CoV,%), [37]; Hydropower share in energy production (%), [95]; Agriculture (crop & livestock 
production, forestry, hunting, and fishing) value added share of GDP (%), [95]. Note: missing data for 
agricultural GDP in Malawi. 
 
Figure 4: Kendall's tau correlations a) between concurrent DJF Nino3.4 SST and DJF rainfall for the 30 
years from 1982/83 to 2011/12; and b) between ECHAM4.5-MOM3-DC2 downscaled seasonal 
forecasts for DJF produced in November and observed DJF rainfall (Source: ref. 36). See SI Methods 
and data. 
 
Figure 5: Simulated climate change impacts on rain-fed and irrigated maize yield in the top-five 
producing countries of southern Africa for the near, medium and long-time horizon under RCP 8.5. The 
bottom and top of the box are lower and upper quartiles, respectively; the band near the middle of the 
box is the median value across each set of simulations, which comprises an ensemble of 30 impact 
simulations (see ref. 46). 
 
Figure 6: Water resources transfers (km
3
) through food trade (a) among southern African nations (b) 
and the rest of the world (RoW) in 2007. Ribbon colors indicate the country of export.  Sources: trade 
data [96], hydrology with H08 global model [97-98], in ref. 77. 
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Country  
GDP 
(10^9 
current 
US$) 
 
GDP per 
capita 
(current 
US$) 
Energy 
imports (% 
consumption) 
Freshwater 
withdrawal (% 
total actual 
renewable water 
resources)  
Cereal import 
dependency 
ratio (%) 
Area 
equipped 
for irrigation 
(% 
cultivated 
land)  
 
Economy Economy Energy self-
sufficiency 
Water 
Sustainability 
Food self-
sufficiency 
Water-food 
Angola 115 5,540 
32 
0.48 55 2 
Botswana 14.5 7,250 
63 
1.6 90 1 
DRC 18 420 
5 
0.05 37 0.1 
Lesotho 2.3 1,130 
* 
1.4 85 1 
Madagascar 10 440 
* 
4.9 10 31 
Malawi 4.2 270 
* 
7.9 6 2 
Mozambique 14.4 570 
21 
0.4 31 3 
Namibia 13.4 5,930 
84 
1.6 65 1 
South Africa 382 7,310 
46 
24 19 13 
Swaziland 4.1 3,290 
* 
23 79 26 
Tanzania 28 610 
13 
5.4 13 2 
Zambia 20.6 1,460 
14 
1.5 5 6 
Zimbabwe 12.5 910 
10 
21 52 5 
*Data unavailable 
Table 1: Economic indicators and climate sensitive economic activities across water, energy and food. 
Sources: GDP (2012), [95]; Energy (2012), [99]; Water use (2000-2005), [77,100]; Food trade (2007-
2009), [96], Irrigation (1960-2005), [77,100].  
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Country Corr full 
record – GDP 
Growth 
Sliding corr 
mean – GDP 
Growth 
Sliding corr 
min – GDP 
Growth 
Sliding corr 
max – GDP 
Growth 
Angola (1986-2012) 0.19 0.06 -0.12 0.26 
Botswana (1961-2012) -0.06 0.04 -0.77 0.62 
DRC (1961-2012) 0.18 0.10 -0.50 0.44 
Lesotho (1961-2012) 0.17 0.10 -0.29 0.50 
Madagascar (1961-2012) -0.14 -0.12 -0.43 0.25 
Malawi (1961-2012) 0.21 0.23 -0.15 0.47 
Mozambique (1981-2012) 0.11 0.22 -0.1 0.63 
Namibia (1981-2012) 0.15 -0.07 -0.32 0.24 
South Africa (1961-2012) 0.08 0.36 0.02 0.7 
Swaziland (1971-2012) -0.02 -0.04 -0.27 0.33 
Tanzania (1989-2012) -0.07 0.03 -0.06 0.14 
Zambia (1961-2012) 0.09 0.19 -0.31 0.68 
Zimbabwe (1961-2012) 0.01 0.05 -0.46 0.64 
Table 2: National-level correlation coefficients between annual GDP percentage growth rate (calendar 
year) and rainfall (October year-1 to September current year). Mean, maximum and minimum 
correlations from 15-year sliding Correlations significant at 1% level are bold, and at 5% in italics. 
Sources: GDP
 
[95], rainfall
 
[37]. 
 
 
 
 
 
